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FLORIDA'S STREAMS - WATER RIGHTS IN
A WATER WONDERLAND*
FRANK

E.

MALONEY

and

SHELDON J. PLAGER**

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT'

Under the federal form of government existing in the United
States, the states, as successors to the Crown, inherited the sovereign's
rights in the lands and the waters of the realm. It is generally agreed
that originally the King owned all the lands and waters in his proprietary capacity. He could grant these to whomever he pleased. As
the law developed, a grant of a tract of land bounded by a stream or
river was presumed to carry with it the contiguous land covered by
the water. The theory was that, by naming a stream as a boundary,
the natural inference was that the middle line of the stream was the
intended boundary, that is, the line equidistant from the land on
either side. The presumption could of course be rebutted by the
2
calls of the deed.
"This is the second in a series of articles on Florida's Water Law. It is based
in part on studies made in 1956 by the Water Law Subcommittee of The Florida
Bar for the Florida Water Resources Study Commission. The first article appeared in 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 119 (1957).
Although any errors of omission or commission in this article are, of course,
the responsibility of the authors, credit for much of the basic research must be
given to the subcommittee's research assistants, who were Dana Bullen III, Robert
T. Carlile, Stephen C. McAliley, and Dewey Villareal. In addition, the authors
wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Mrs. Grace Taylor, Assistant Librarian.
University of Florida College of Law, for her invaluable assistance in the additional
research necessary.
"Frank E. Maloney, B.A. 1938, University of Toronto; LL.B. 1942, University
of Florida; Chairman, Water Law Subcommittee of The Florida Bar, 1956-57;
Chairman, Water Law and Drafting Committees of the Florida Water Resources
Study Commission, 1956-57; Counsel to the Commission, 1957; Professor of Law,
University of Florida, and currently Visiting Professor of Law, New York University, School of Law, New York, New York.
Sheldon J. Plager, A.B. 1952, University of North Carolina; Research Assisrant.
Water Law Subcommittee, Florida Water Resources Study Commission, 1956-57:
Senior, College of Law, University of Florida.
'See, generally, 1 FLA. STAT. ANN. CXX (1943); Annot., 23 A.L.R. 757 (1923);
Annot., 35 L. Ed. 1225 (1901); 28 HALSBURY, LAws OF ENGLAND 358 (1914).
2
See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 597 (1931), for collected cases on the determination of
boundaries of riparian lands by construction of the deed.
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WATER RIGHTS

The riparian proprietor whose land bounded on a river or stream
thus acquired exclusive ownership in the soil and water to the middle
thread of the current, as well as the title to all islands lying between
the mainland and the center of the stream. 3 A dearth of English case
law concerning the applicability of these principles to lakes and ponds
at first left the matter somewhat in doubt. The absence of case precedent is understandable in view of the topography of England, a land of
many running streams and brooks but few lakes of significance. In
1878 the English House of Lords, in Bristow v. Cormican4 construed
the common law rules concerning streams to be equally applicable to
a grant of a lake bed in 1660. Although this decision is not binding
in Florida as part of the common law, this view is now commonly accepted in America.5
Some time prior to the American Revolution the concept of navigability became superimposed on the existing law, and the dichotomy
between legal rights relating to navigable and nonnavigable waters
arose. There is some conflict among the writers as to the exact development of the.English law.6 It seems fair to say, however, that a
distinction was made between tidal and nontidal waters, or, in terms
more familiar, between salt and fresh waters. Tidal waters were
deemed "navigable in law," while waters not tidal, even though
traversible by water-borne commerce, were not so considered.
If a body of water was thus labeled navigable, it became in a sense
public domain, and the public's right to access and enjoyment of
the water was not fettered by concepts of private property. This,
however, did not necessarily prevent the underlying bed from passing
into private ownership, although there is some question as to whether
adjoining owners on a tidal bay or river designated as navigable in
3E.g., Middleton v. Prichard, 4 Ill. (Scammon) 0509, 0520 (1842) (dictum).
43 App. Cas. 641 (1878).
5See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371, 389 (1891): "[S]till water as well as
rivers and streams was the subject of private ownership by the old English Law."
6Cornpare 12 B.U.L. REv. 169 (1932): "Nothing could be more clear and reasonable than the English common law on this subject. Water which is an arm of
the sea is public and belongs to the sovereign; water not an arm of the sea, that
is nontidal water,... belongs to the adjoining proprietors," with Annot., 23 A.L.R.
757 (1923): "Three absolutely false premises have been assumed by [American]
courts as a basis for their opinions .... These false premises are that, at common
law, only waters in which the tide ebbed and flowed were regarded as navigable;
that there was a distinction in the power of the King over tidal and nontidal
waters; and that he held the title to tidal waters in trust for the people, so that
he could not grant them into private ownership."
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law could take advantage of the presumption that the grant of the
riparian land carried with it the contiguous land covered by the water.
If the body of water was labeled nonnavigable in law, both the
underlying bed and the water itself passed into private ownership
in accordance with the common law presumption or the calls of the
deed, whichever was controlling. But if the waters were navigable
in fact, that is, commercially traversible, even though privately
owned they were subject to a servitude or easement in the public
for purposes of navigation.
Thus, with the exception of the great seas, where private ownership of the bed or the water is obviously inappropriate, and small
lakes and ponds which were of no interest to anyone except the surrounding landowners to whom they clearly belonged, the common
law struggled with concepts of navigability, private property, and
servitudes, and the result was largely a distinction without a difference.
Both the distinction and the difference assumed greater proportions in the hands of American lawgivers. Two major shifts occurred: the dividing line between navigable and nonnavigable waters was completely redefined, and private ownership of the underlying lands in the newly-enlarged area of navigable waters was largely
discredited.
As early as 1641 a Massachusetts colonial ordinance provided that
title to all ponds more than ten acres in area vested in the state, and
that such ponds should be free for any man to fish or fowl there.7
Other states employed various devices to assert public ownership of
waters and their underlying beds, one of the most popular being the
trust theory, under which the state held title in trust for all the
people. In keeping with common law phraseology, the sovereign's interest was limited to navigable bodies, except that navigable now came
to mean capable of any reasonable public use regardless of whether
the waters were fresh or salt, lake or stream.8
Florida has kept pace with the development of American water
law. The Florida Court early enunciated the doctrine that the state
held title to the lands under navigable waters in trust for all the
people, and that the trust was governmental in nature, meaning that
the state could convey title to such lands to private individuals, but
that the conveyances could not act to alienate the state's interest in
the "control and regulation of the uses afforded by the land and the
7See Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,
SSee p. 309 infra.

393 (dictum) (1891).
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waters," or to "divert them from their proper uses for the public
welfare." 9
This doctrine, applicable to the vast majority of Florida's lakes
and streams as a result of the Florida Court's defining of the term
navigable as navigable in fact,1o ensures to some extent that one of
the state's most valuable natural resources will not pass completely
out of the public domain. The price paid for this retention is the
creation of many areas of doubt concerning the relative rights of the
individual and the public in the waters and their beds. It is the purpose of this article and the other articles in this series to explore these
areas, primarily in the light of Florida statutory and case law, with
consideration of federal law when appropriate.
THE NATURAL WATERCOURSE
In Florida the meaning of the term "natural watercourse"'1 has
developed in connection with problems of drainage or disposition of
water rather than in terms of the use of water. The most important
case in this connection is Davis v. Ivey, 2 in which the question was
the extent to which a railroad in traversing a natural watercourse
must make provision for the passage of water through or under its
3
right of way. The Florida Supreme Court said:'
"A natural watercourse is a natural stream bed having bottom
and sides in which water usually flows in a defined bed or
channel. It is not essential to constitute a natural watercourse,
that the flowing should be uniform or uninterrupted. The
other elements existing, a stream does not lose its character or
cease to be a natural watercourse because in time of drought
oBroward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 408, 50 So. 826; 829 (1909). See also FLA. STAT.
§370.03(1) (1955): "All beds and bottoms of navigable rivers, bayous, lagoons,
lakes, bays, sounds, inlets, oceans, gulfs and other bodies of water within the
jurisdiction of Florida shall be the property of the State except such as may be
held under some grant or alienation heretofore made."
1OE.g., Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).
"iThe courts and text writers often talk in terms of the law of "streams and
watercourses." No consistent distinction is to be found between a stream and a
watercourse; if anything, the term "watercourse" would seem to encompass streams,
as well as rivers, creeks, and similar bodies. The terms will be used interchangeably in this article unless the context requires otherwise.
1293 Fla. 387, 112-So. 264 (1927).
13Id. at 402, 112 So. at 269.
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the flow may be diminished or temporarily suspended. It is
sufficient if it is usually a stream of running water."
Although the Court states that temporary suspension of flow in
time of drought does not cause a stream to lose its character, it had
indicated earlier that the stream must have a well-defined and natural existence. 14 This would seem to preclude the conclusion that
watercourses flowing only in times of flood or abnormally high water
are to be considered natural watercourses.
Under the common law as applied in Florida, rights to use of
the water and incidents of ownership in a natural watercourse fall
into two contrasting groups: those attributable to a watercourse navigable in fact and those operative upon a determination that the watercourse is nonnavigable. A natural watercourse that is not navigable
is susceptible of private ownership in the same way that any other
real property is susceptible of private ownership.' 5 The owner of
the bed has the same interest in the water that he has in the underlying land, and he is entitled to exclude the public and perhaps
even owners of adjacent submerged lands from entering on or traversing his property.-6
If a natural watercourse is navigable, title to the bed is vested
in the state in its sovereign capacity, 7 but rights to use of the water
arise both in the public and in private adjoining landowners. Landowners whose property borders on a navigable watercourse own to
the high-water mark' 8 and have rights in common in the use and
l4Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 598, 20 So. 780, 783 (1896)
(dictum).
15Martin v. Busch, 93 Fla. 535, 112 So. 274 (1927); Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla.
125, 77 So. 666 (1918); Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
16See Note, 5 U. FLA. L. RFv. 166
(1951), for a brief discussion of the common
law view, permitting the owner of part of the bed of a nonnavigable body of water
to fence his part off, as opposed to the civil law rule imposing a reasonable use
limitation.
17Minneapolis Mills Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349 (1897); Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1893); State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353
(1908); see note 9 supra. This is subject to certain exceptions in Florida in cases
in which Spanish land grants specifically included grants of submerged land. See
Apalachicola Land and Development Co. v. McRae, 86 Fla. 393, 98 So. 505 (1923).
IsSouth Florida Farms Co. v. Goodno, 84 Fla. 532, 94 So. 672 (1922). In Tilden
v. Smith, 94 Fla. 502, 512, 113 So. 708, 712 (1927), it was stated: "'[The] high
water mark as a line between a riparian owner and the public is to be determined
by examining the bed and the bank and ascertaining where the presence and action
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consumption of water. These rights are known as riparian rights;19
and the bordering land, ownership of which entitles one to the rights
of a riparian owner, is called riparian land. The public has the right
to use the water for certain purposes, such as boating, bathing, and
fishing.
RiGHTs ATRIBUTABLE TO A NAVIGABLE NATURAL WATERCOURSE

Rights of a RiparianOwner
In Ferry Pass Inspectors' and Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River
Inspectors' and Shippers' Ass'n 2° the Florida Court said:
"Among the common law rights of those who own land bordering on navigable water, apart from rights of alluvion and
dereliction, are the right of access to the water from the land
for navigation and other purposes expressed or implied by law,
the right to a reasonable use of the water for domestic purposes, the right to the flow of the water without serious interruption by upper or lower riparian owners or others, the
right to have the water kept free from pollution, the right to
protect the abutting property from trespass and from injury
by the improper use of the water for navigation or other purposes, the right to prevent obstruction to navigation or an unlawful use of the water or of the shore or bed that specially
injures the riparian owner in the use of his property, the right
to use the water in common with the public for navigation,
fishing and other purposes in which the public has an interest."
The Court has since further stated: 22
of the water are so common and usual and so long continued in all ordinary years
as to mark upon the soil of the bed a character distinct from that of the banks
in respect to vegetation, as well as to the nature of the soil itself. ... [T]hat only
is to be considered the bed which the water occupies sufficiently long and continuously to wrest it from vegetation and to destroy its value for agricultural purposes."' (Emphasis deleted).
-aThe term "riparian rights" is sometimes used to denote rights of owners of
lands on the banks of watercourses, without any effort to distinguish betiveen
navigable and nonnavigable bodies. For clarity of presentation, use of the term in
this article will be limited to the rights of an owner on a navigable body of water.
2057 Fla. 399, 402, 48 So. 643, 644 (1909).
2'Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 401, 50 So. 826, 827 (1909); accord, Thiesen
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"These special rights are easements incident to the riparian holdings and are property rights that may be regulated
by law but may not be taken without just compensation and
due process of law."
22
In a 1953 act the Florida Legislature declared:

"Riparian rights are those incident to land bordering upon
navigable waters. They are rights of ingress, egress, boating,
bathing and fishing and such others as may be or have been
defined by law. Such rights are not of a proprietary nature.
They are rights inuring to the owner of the riparian land but
are not owned by him. They are appurtenant to and are inseparable from the riparian land. The land to which the
owner holds title must extend to the ordinary high water mark
of the navigable water in order that riparian rights may attach."
The apparent inconsistency between this statute and the preceding
case law seems to be largely verbal. Although the statute states that
riparian rights are not of a proprietary nature, it would be difficult
indeed to distinguish the legislatively recognized characteristics of
these rights from those recognized by the Court as proprietary rights
that cannot be taken without just compensation. And in the event
of conflict between the two, presumably the case law would control,
and the statute would be unconstitutional.
a. Nonconsumptive Uses
The generally recognized nonconsumptive uses of a navigable
watercourse are boating, fishing, and similar uses. Additional rights
in navigable watercourses have been approved by the Florida Court.
Two of these, drainage and damming, are of major significance to
the riparian owner.
Drainage. Assuming the existence of a natural watercourse passing through riparian land, the riparian owner is presumably entitled
v. Gulf F. 9- A. Ry., 75 Fla. 28, 78 So. 491 (1918). See also Op. Att'y Gen. Fla.
056-113 (1956).
22Fla. Laws 1953, c. 28262, now FLA. STAT. §271.09 (1) (1955).
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to deepen the watercourse in order to better drain his land. 23 Thus
the owner of a dominant estate has the right to drain water into a
natural watercourse even though this increases the quantity of water
on the lower estate. An earlier Florida case apparently limits such
drainage, indicating that a riparian owner may not divert waters into
24
a natural drain if they would not normally find their way into it.
This limitation, in turn, must be considered in the light of a provision of the Florida Constitution authorizing the Legislature to provide for drainage of the land of one person over or through that of
another upon just compensation.

2 5

The Court has also sanctioned the use of natural watercourses for
drainage of industrial waste water, at least to the extent that the
stream is capable of carrying off waste water without harm to lower
riparian owners. In Bray v. Winter Garden26 a lower owner who
failed to dear an obstruction in his part of the stream was denied
relief against an upper owner who dumped industrial waste waters
into the stream. The Court decided that if the lower owner had removed the obstruction the waters would have passed harmlessly
through his land. By implication at least, the Bray case indicated
that an upper riparian owner could not ditch his land in such a
manner as would cause the watercourse to overflow downstream land
during periods of high water. Although this has not been definitely
settled by case law in Florida, factual studies show that it is a distinct
problem in a number of Florida localities.27 Moreover, although
the case indicates that a -lower riparian owner cannot complain of
flooding if caused by his failure to remove an obstruction in the
stream where it passes through his land, the question remains unsettled in Florida whether upper owners whose lands are being flooded
23Edason v. Denison, 142 Fla. 101, 194 So. 342 (1940); cf. Bray v. Winter
Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949).
24Callan v. G. M. Cypher Co., 71 Fla. 14, 25, 70 So. 841, 844 (1916) (dictum).
25FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §28.
2640 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949).
27See FLORIDA VATER RESOURcES STUDY COMM'N, REPORT OF COUNTY COMMrrTmEs ON WATER PROBLEMS (1956) (hereinafter cited as 1956 REPORT) 45, §I.C.2.
(Leon County); id. at 58, §I.A.1. (Okaloosa County); id. at 47, §I.A.l. (Levy
County); id. at 14, §I.C.I. (Columbia County); FLORIDA ASS'N OF SOIL CONSERVATION DiSm. SUPERVISORS, PRELIMINARY SUMMARY or DATA ON WATER PROBLEMS
(1954) (hereinafter cited as 1954 REPORT) §II.A.I., problems 8 (Flagler County), 28
(Martin County); id. §II.C., all problems (Bay, Glades, Hamilton, Hendry, Highlands, Indian River, Lee, Marion, Martin, Okeechobee, Orange, Osceola, Polk,
Sarasota, Sumter Counties).
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because of such an obstruction can legally require the lower owner
to remove it.28 Surveys indicate that this also is a problem existing
2
in the state. 9
Dams. The right of a riparian owner to construct a dam across
30
a natural watercourse running through his land is well recognized.
This common law right was not dependent upon a characterization of
navigability or nonnavigability, although a determination of navigability may now impose both federal and state limitations on this
right. 31 The right to dam does not include the right to injure; the
builders of a dam may be liable to both upper and lower riparian
owners for any injury they sustain as a result of the construction of
2
the dam.3
The injury to which the upper owner is most susceptible is the
flooding of his lands by water backed up by the dam. Even though
the strict liability doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher33 generally is not
applied by American courts to the damming of the bed of a natural
stream, 34 damages have been recovered on the basis of trespass 35
and of private nuisance, 36 and injunctive relief has been granted on
the grounds of unreasonable use.328Cf. Toy v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 176 Md. 197, 4 A.2d 757 (1939) (special
damages for injury from obstruction by debris); Wilhite v. Billings & Eastern Montana Power Co., 39 Mont. 1, 101 Pac. 168 (1909) (mandatory injunction against
obstructing by dams, embankments, or dikes).
291956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 5, §II.A.l. (Brevard County); id. at 10, §I.A.I.
(Charlotte County); id. at 27, §II.A.1. (Flagler County); id. at 47, §II.A.1. (Levy
County); id. at 58, §I.A.l. (Okeechobee County); id. at 65, §LI.A.l. (Pasco County);
1954 REPORT, supra note 27, §II.A.I., problems 7 (DeSoto County), 13 (Hendry
County), 19 (Lee County), 24 (Manatee County), 32 (Okeechobee County).
5
0See Humphreys-Mexia Co. v. Arseneaux, 116 Tex. 603, 612, 297 S.W. 225, 230
(1927) (dictum); 2 FARNHAM. WATERS §475 (1904).
3
See p. 315 infra.
32E.g., Gulf States Steel Co. v. Law, 224 Ala. 667, 141 So. 641 (1932); Callison v.
Mt. Shasta Power Corp., 123 Cal. App. 247, 11 P.2d 60 (1932); Winchester Water
Works Co. v. Holliday, 241 Ky. 762, 45 S.W.2d 9 (1931); Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936); McKee v. Delaware & H. Canal Co., 125
N.Y. 353, 26 N.E. 305 (1891).
33L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); see RESTATEMENT, TORTS §850 (1939).
34City Water Power Co. v. Fergus Falls, 113 Minn. 33, 128 N.W. 817 (1910);
King v. Miles City Irrigating Ditch Co., 16 Mont. 463, 41 Pac. 431 (1895); cf. Ague
v. American Agric. Chem. Co., 5 Fla. Stpp. 133 (1953).
3.Wheatley v. City of Fairfield, 221 Iowa 66, 264 N.W. 906 (1936).
a6Gulf States Steel Co. v. Law, 224 Ala. 667, 141 So. 641 (1932).
a-Callison v. Mount Shasta Power Corp., 123 Cal. App. 247. 11 P.2d 60 (1932).
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The Florida studies have revealed a number of instances of flooding resulting from construction of dams for irrigation, 38 municipal
use, 39 or creation of lakes for fishing and recreation. 40 Although no
Florida cases precisely in point were found, a dictum in FloridaPower
Co. v. Cason4l indicates that compensation might be obtained by injured landowners if the use of the dam was considered unreasonable
with reference to the rights of the affected landowners.
This same dictum may provide a basis for liability of an owner
who erects a dam that bursts or otherwise releases large quantities of
water, resulting in damage to lower riparian owners. Here again the
doctrine of strict liability has been rejected when the dam failure re' 2
sulted from an unprecedented cloudburst or other "act of God."
3
The problem of bursting dams is not unknown in Florida.4 Not
only have dams failed from natural causes but several failures have
apparently resulted from disgruntled neighbors dynamiting the
dams."4 Although the upper riparian owner might not be liable for
harm resulting from such dynamiting, the culprits, if apprehended,
of course would be civilly as well as criminally liable. 45
If a natural watercourse separates two adjoining landowners,
neither one has an unqualified right in the absence of statute to
place a dam across the stream so as to abut or otherwise trespass on
his neighbor's land.46 An early Florida statute,4 similar to the Mill
Acts so frequently found in other statess enables a riparian owner
on one side of a watercourse who wishes to erect a dam for furnish381956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 83, §II.A.I. (Walton County); 1954 REPoRT,
supra note 27, §II.A.1, problems 16 (Highlands County), 22 (Madison County), 35
(Pasco County), 42 (Union County).
311954 REPORT, supra note 27, §II.A.I., problem 36 (Pinellas County).
401d. problem 25 (Manatee County).
4179 Fla. 619, 626, 84 So. 921, 923 (1920).
42
Bratton v. Rudnick, 283 Mass. 556, 186 N.E. 669 (1933); Nichols v. Mausland,

2 Ex. D. 1 (1876).
431956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 41, §I.A.2. (Jackson County); 1954 REPORT,
supra note 27, §II.A.I., problems 9 (Gadsden County), 10 (Hamilton County), 44
(Walton County).
441954 REPORT, supra note 27, §IIA.I., problems 16 (Highlands County), 18
(Jackson County).
45FLA. STAT. §552.14 (1955).
"6See 2 FARNHAM, WATERS §531 (1904).
47Fla. Laws 1903, c. 5198, now FLA. STAT. §361.02 (1955).
4sSee Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Oury v. Goodwin, 3 Ariz.
255, 26 Pac. 376 (1891); Olmstead v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532 (1866). There is also
special legislation in Florida, e.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 10364.
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ing power to acquire, by eminent domain proceedings, land on the
opposite side against which his dam will abut. The act also provides
for the acquisition of surrounding lands that would be overflowed
by the erection of the dam. It has been held that statutory authorization for the construction of such dams does not prevent or limit
liability for injury resulting therefrom. 49 The Mill Acts concern
themselves solely with construction of dams for water power purposes; there are no specific provisions dealing with construction of
dams for irrigation, industrial, or similar uses. In 1957 the Florida
Legislature enacted a bill which permits the Trustees of the Internal
Improvement Fund to authorize riparian owners to "construct, maintain and operate structures and facilities on, in and under the bed
of any navigable stream . ..for the purpose of providing water of
a suitable quality for industrial, domestic or other use." 50 Although
the act does not provide condemnation powers, and does not mention
dams specifically, a broad interpretation might find dam construction
within the scope of the statute.
In periods of drought, such as the state recently experienced, the
problem is not one of inundation but of deprivation. Studies indicate
that impounding of water, for irrigation or other purposes, by damming has resulted in loss by downstream owners of their source of
water. In a number of instances this has meant inadequate water
supply for irrigation 5l and watering of stock, 5 2 and in some extreme
cases total drying up of the lower stream bed with the accompanying
loss of water for any purpose. 53 If this type of activity is deemed an
unreasonable use, injunctive relief may be available to the injured
lower owner, although the equitable remedy may be refused on the
54
balance of convenience doctrine.
b. Consumptive Uses
Florida's water law has generally developed within the confines
49See Healey v. Citizens Gas and Elec. Co., 199 Iowa 82, 201 N.W. 118 (1924);
cf. Florida Power Co. v. Cason, 79 Fla. 619, 84 So. 921 (1920).
50FIa. Laws 1957, c. 57-325.
511956 REPoRT, supra note 27, at 1, §II.A.4. (Alachua County); id. at 15, §II.A.4.
(Columbia County).
521d. at 80, §II.A.4. (Union County); id. at 29, §I.A.4. (Gilchrist County).
331d. at 80, §II.A.4. (Union County); id. at 83, §1.A.4. (Walton County); id.
at 78, §II.A.4. (Suwannee County).
54See Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern States,
ParticularlyAs Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159, 167 (1952).
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of the riparian system. The earliest cases put primary emphasis on
the right of riparian owners to have the water flow to them in its
normal course, undiminished in quantity or quality.55 The only
uses sanctioned were for domestic and household purposes, including
the watering of farm animals, and these uses were generally referred
to as "natural" uses, as distinguished from "artificial" uses such as irrigation and manufacturing. As a general rule a riparian owner was
permitted to use such water as was necessary for his natural uses regardless of the effect on other owners.
As means of effectively utilizing water increased, emphasis shifted
to the right of riparian owners to make reasonable uses of the water
for artificial purposes as it flowed by their property; what was reasonable depended on the uses being made by other riparians who had
an equal right to use the water. In some states there is a recent trend
toward de-emphasizing this distinction between natural and artificial
uses and recognizing in riparian owners a common or correlative
right in a stream, with each owner being entitled to make such natural
or artificial use of the water as is reasonable under the circumstances,
taking into consideration all the uses of other riparian owners.56 Although this change in conceptual approach itself provides no answers, it perhaps makes the machinery for solution more flexible.
The state of development of the Florida law in so far as withdrawals for consumptive uses are concerned is not too clear. In one
early case in which the primary consideration was the pollution of an
"underground stream" then being used as a source of water supply
by the City of Tampa, the Supreme Court of Florida restated the
riparian rule with the reasonable use modification. 57 The Court did
not indicate, however, the extent to which diversion for so-called
artificial uses such as irrigation or manufacturing might be permitted;
and, since the case was a pollution case, it did not in any event es5See generally Maloney, Florida's New Water Resources Law, 10 U. FLA. L.
REv. 125, 128 nA0 (1957).
5OSee discussion in Marquis, Freeman and Heath, The Movement for New
Water Rights Laws in the Tennessee Valley States, 23 TENN. L. REv. 797, 807

(1955).
57Tampa Waterworks v. Cline, 37 Fla. 586, 595, 20 So. 780, 782 (1896). The
Court said: "The right to the benefit and advantage of the water flowing past one
owner's land is subject to the similar rights of all proprietors on the banks of the
stream to the reasonable enjoyment of a natural bounty, and it is therefore only
for an unauthorized and unreasonable use of a common benefit that any one has
just cause to complain."
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tablish a binding precedent concerning consumptive use. The decision
indicates, however, that when the problem is squarely presented to
the Court it will probably adopt the reasonable use aspect of the
riparian doctrine and permit diversions that do not unreasonably
interfere with use by other riparian owners.
Assuming the application of the reasonable use doctrine to the
normal flow of Florida's watercourses, two problems arise: Is a riparian owner entitled to use water for artificial uses only on his riparian land, or is he entitled to conduct the water to lands not riparian; and in periods of shortage to what extent will the law recognize
priorities for use among domestic, agricultural, and industrial users?
Under strict riparian doctrine it is unlawful to divert water for
use on nonriparian land; riparian owners are not excepted. 58 Although there is an abundance of statute and case law concerning
Florida's riparian lands, the statutes and cases are primarily concerned with techniques for acquiring title to land in and around
natural watercourses rather than the inland limits to which a riparian owner's rights extend. Several approaches to this problem
have been developed in jurisdictions in which a shortage of water
for irrigation exists. Since many of these jurisdictions follow the riparian doctrine, the inland extent of riparian land assumes considerable importance. Use of water for irrigation may be severely
limited by restricting riparian land to the smallest tract held under
one title in the chain of titles leading to the present owner. 50 Under
this rule a parcel of land detached from a riparian tract and no
longer touching the stream loses its riparian status; on the other
hand, inland additions to a riparian tract cannot be made riparian
by coming under the ownership of the owner of the land lying between the newly acquired land and the stream. 60 A broader approach
would entitle an owner of land contiguous to a stream to riparian
rights in all of the land without regard to its extent or from whom
title was acquired."' Some jurisdictions have adopted this broader
approach with the limitation that the land be confined to the watershed of the stream involved. 62 It would seem that in Florida, where
5SSee I KINNEY, A TREATISE ON THE
See also Maloney, supra note 55, at 131.

LAW OF IRRIGATION

§§516-17

(2d ed. 1912).

59See Rancho Santa Margarita v. Vail, 11 Cal.2d 501, 81 P.2d 533 (1938).
6OYearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 Pac. 804 (1928).
6lSee Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 64 Pac. 855, rehearing denied, 39 Ore. 46, 65
Pac. 1068 (1901).
62Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 Pac. 571 (1905).
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in most areas the surface streams carry more than enough water for
irrigation of immediately adjacent land, the broad definition of riparian land, or at least a definition that would allow the use of the
water on a reasonable amount of adjacent land, would be preferable.
To a certain extent the 1957 Florida Legislature alleviated this
aspect of the problem. The Water Resources Law enacted in that
year 3 provides machinery enabling a riparian owner to conduct the
water from a watercourse for use beyond the boundaries of his riparian holdings. The authority for granting such diversions is
vested in the State Board of Conservation and is subject to specified
limitations. 64 Thus by obtaining permission for specific diversions,
the riparian owner can obviate the necessity for determining the extent of his riparian land. Further clarification of the depth of riparian
land might nevertheless be desirable.
The second problem, that of priorities of use among domestic,
agricultural, and industrial users in times of drought, is by no means
academic; conflicts or potential conflicts exist today in a number of
Florida communities. 65 There is legislation in Florida giving municipalities a degree of preference.66 This legislation was not enacted
for the purpose of establishing priorities, however, but to allow municipalities the right to take necessary water through eminent domain proceedings. There is a complete absence of case law on priorities among users during dry periods, or indeed even during periods
of normal flow. In this area Kentucky has taken the lead in legislative clarification.67 Legislation similar to that in Kentucky, establishing a priority for domestic purposes, which in that jurisdiction is defined to include "water for household purposes, drinking water for
livestock, poultry and domestic animals," might be advisable. If this
legislation were enacted in Florida, "domestic animals" should perhaps be defined in such a way as to prevent the possibility of the
63FIa. Laws 1957, c. 57-380, §8 (1) (a).
64See Maloney, supra note 55, at 141, 144.
£51956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 28, §II.A.4. (Gadsden County); 1954 REPORT,
supra note 27, §II.A.4., problems I (Alachua County), 2 (Bradford County), 4
(Charlotte County), 5 (Clay County), 15 (Nassau County), 19 (Sumter County)
(agricultural-domestic); id. problem 4 (Charlotte County) (agricultural-municipal);
id. problem 11 (Holmes County) (domestic-manufacturing); id. problem 14 (Marion
County) (manufacturing-recreational).
GaSee FLA. STAT. c. 180 (1955); FLA. STAT. §361.04 (1955).
67See Ky. REv. STAT. §262.690(3) (1955). This is a section of the Kentucky
Water Conservation Law of 1954. See Maloney, supra note 55, at 132.
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owner of a large herd of commercial feeder cattle using the flow of
a stream to the extent that he deprives those downstream of water
for household purposes.
Rights of the Public
As stated in the Feriy Pass case, the public has the right to use
water in a navigable watercourse for navigation, fishing, and similar
nonconsumptive uses. In addition, the public has the right to use
of the riparian land between the high and low water marks. On this
basis a riparian owner in 1909 was denied an injunction by which
he sought to prevent a stranger, engaged in the logging business, from
using the shore in front of the owner's riparian holdings for the
purpose of inspecting and working on the stranger's logs. The Court
indicated that the plaintiff could have relief from a denial of access
to the water, but that he did not have an exclusive right to the use
of either the waters or the shore adjacent to his riparian holding.6s
Moreover, if a street runs to a navigable stream, the shore and submerged lands at the end of the street apparently belong to the
public rather than to the owner of the fee in the street, and members
of the public have the right of free access to the stream.39
Prior to 1957 a limited right to consumptive use by the public
had been recognized. In 1927, in Tilden v. Smith,7o the Supreme
Court of Florida indicated that flood water from streams that is of
no substantial benefit to a riparian owner "may be appropriated
by any person who can lawfully gain access to the stream, and may
be conducted to land not riparian, and even beyond the watershed
of the stream, without the consent of the riparian owner, and without
compensation to him." The General Assembly of Kentucky in 1954
enacted legislation to provide similar guarantees as to surplus water
in periods of heavy flow. An irrigator, in some cases, may acquire a
reasonably reliable supply from this source, and in fact in Kentucky
about half of the irrigators use this method of acquiring and storing
irrigation water 7 1 Similarly the Central and Southern Florida Flood
Control District is planning to collect and store excess flood waters,
GsFerry Pass Inspectors' and Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' and
Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643 (1909).
69Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325, 333 (1859) (dictum); cf. Brickell v. Fort Lauderdale,
75 Fla. 622, 78 So. 681 (1918).
7094 Fla. 502, 511, 113 So. 708, 711 (1927) (dictum based on a California case).
71
LEGISLATIVE REsEARc" COMM'N, WATER RIGHTs LAW IN KENTUCKY 75 (1956).
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and these waters will then become available to irrigators in the Lake
Okeechobee area of the district.72 The state will thus benefit by the
potential increase in the area under cultivation.
The 1957 Florida Water Resources Law7 3 expands the dictum in
the Tilden case and provides statutory authorization for the capture,
storage, and use of all water in excess of existing reasonable uses and,
as noted above, for diversion of such waters beyond riparian or overlying land.
Federal legislation authorizing federal-state flood control projects
provides for sale of surplus waters collected in federally maintained
and operated reservoirs.7 4 The Secretary of the Army may sell the
water in these reservoirs "at such prices and on such terms as he may
deem reasonable." 75 The legislation authorizing the sales contains a
provision that contracts for the water shall not adversely affect existing lawful uses of the water, a provision that would protect irrigators who were already operating in an area when a flood control
project went into operation.
NAvIGABILrTY

The State Test
The entire structure of riparian rights, and the attendant rights
of the public, depends on a determination that the natural watercourse involved is navigable. Since these rights are common law
rights, the determination will be governed by state law.
The Legislature of Florida has not seen fit to define "navigable"
or to characterize a navigable stream, but Florida cases dating back
to 1889 have established judicial criteria76 In the early case of Bucki
v. Gone,7 7 involving injury to a bridge on the Suwannee River near
White Springs, the Florida Court, after pointing out that at common
law tidal streams were regarded as navigable, went on to say:
"[Iun this country all rivers, without regard to the ebb and
.2MARSHALL AND YOUNG, PUBLIC ADMINISRATION

OF FLORIDA'S NATURAL RESOURCES

55 (Public Adm'n Clearing Serv., Studies in Public Adm'n, No. 9, 1953).
73Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-380, §8 (1) (a).
7458 STAT. 890 (1944), 33-U.S.C. §708 (1946).
751bid.
76See Hunt, Riparian Rights in Florida, 8 U. FLA. L. REV. 363, 394 (1955).
7725 Fla. 1, 18, 6 So. 160, 161 (1889).
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flow of the tide, are generally regarded as navigable as far up
as they may be conveniently used at all seasons of the year
with vessels, boats, barges or other water craft for purposes of
commerce; and others are regarded as navigable when so declared by statute. Further than this, what constitutes a navigable river free to the public is a question of fact to be determined by the natural condition in each case. A stream of sufficient capacity and volume of water to float to market the
products of the country will answer the conditions of navigability ... whatever the character of the product, or the kind of
floatage suited to their conditions ....

[I] t is not essential...

that the stream should be continuously, at all seasons of the
year, in a state suited to such floatage."
This case established that Florida watercourses may be considered
navigable even though they are so shallow as to be suitable only for
the floating of logs, and that they need not be of sufficient depth to
float vessels.
Two points in this definition were clarified in later dicta. Concerning navigability of tidal waterways, the Court in 1921 took the
position that these waterways were not navigable unless they were
in such condition as to be in fact capable of navigation for useful
public purposes; contrary to what was apparently the common law
rule, waterways are not navigable "merely because they are affected
by the tide." 781 Concerning continuity of navigation, the Supreme
Court of Florida, in a 1909 case involving title to the bed of Lake
Jackson, held the lake to be navigable even though most of the lake
bed during ordinary water levels could be navigated only by flatbottomed boats drawing no more than six inches of water, and large
portions of the bottom of the lake were dried out for such long periods of time that crops were planted and harvested on the bed. The
fact that the lake went dry at times did not strip it of navigability,
since the Court found that in its ordinary state it was navigable.79
The Florida Court has also considered the relationship to navigability of the meandering of the boundary of a stream in the original
official survey of the state. In the Bucki case the Court held that the
survey the river was meandered provides a
fact that in the original
"mark" of navigability.80 However, the fact that a stream was or was
TsTarpon Springs v. Smith, 81 Fla. 479, 498, 88 So. 613, 619 (1921) (dictum).
-9Broward v. Mabry, 58 Fla. 398, 50 So. 826 (1909).
S0Bucki v. Cone, 25 Fla. 1, 6 So. 160 (1889).

WATER RIGHTS
not meandered is only evidence of navigability, and in the last analysis the test of navigability is whether the watercourse is navigable
in fact. The Court has held that the fact that a stream was not meandered, that lines of survey were protracted over the bed of the river,
and that patents were issued therefor does not change the navigable
character of the river or serve to convey title to the land under the
river."' Moreover, when a stream is meandered, the meanders are not
necessarily the boundaries of the stream; hence a purchaser who receives a deed from the United States conveying land shown to be
bordering on a navigable river takes title up to the actual water
mark rather than the meander line.82
To come within the state definition of navigability as navigability
in fact, the watercourse must in its natural state be capable of sustaining navigation, without artificial improvement.83 It may be necessary, however, to distinguish between a stream that is in no part navigable until artificially improved and one that is partly navigable in
its natural state and subsequently improved. As to the latter, the
Attorney General has taken the position that "where existing navigable waters are improved by raising the level thereof by artificial
means, navigation will not be confined to the original channels, but
extends to such of the waters as may be navigable after the raising'
84
of the level of waters."
The Federal Test
Contrary to the state rule, determination that.a watercourse is
navigable under federal law does not in itself establish proprietary
interests. A federal finding of navigability does not strip the state of
its title to the bed of the watercourse,8 5 but it does place drastic limitations on the control of a state over the use of the waters in the
watercourse, and indirectly affects both riparian and public rights.$(
siState ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 56 Fla. 603, 47 So. 353 (1908).
82Lord v. Curry, 71 Fla. 68, 71 So. 21 (1916).
S3Clement v. Watson, 63 Fla. 109, 58 So. 25 (1912).
s4OP. ATi'Y GEN. FLA. 055-157 (1955).
SSSee, e.g., James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937); Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936); United States v. Arizona, 295 U.S. 174
(1935); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S.
64 (1931); Massachusetts v. New York, 271 U.S. 65 (1926); Barney v. Keokuk, 94
U.S. 324 (1876).
SEgan v. Hart, 165 U.S. 188 (1897); accord, Pound v. Turck 95 U.S. 459 (1877);
Leitch v. Chicago, 41 F.2d 728 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 891 (1930).
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It is, therefore, of importance to examine the origin of this federal
power and its relationship to navigation. The power stems from the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution. s7 Interpreting the
meaning of this clause in 1865, the Supreme Court of the United
States said:88
"Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate
commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to
the extent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United
States which are accessible from a state other than those in
which they lie. For this purpose, they are the public property
of the nation, and subject to all the requisite legislation by
Congress."
Since all or practically all of Florida's navigable watercourses run
into the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico and hence "are accessible from a state other than those in which they lie," Congress
has the power to legislate concerning them.
Basically, the federal test of navigability is the same as that used
in Florida, that is, navigability in fact. 9 As in the state cases, actual
use is the best evidence of navigability. The use need not be made
by vessels, and use for floating logs is sufficient to render a stream
navigable.90 Moreover, although the basis of federal control is the
commerce clause, the Supreme Court of the United States has indicated that use of a waterway need not be commercially important to
sustain federal intervention; use by private boats, such as is frequently
the case in Florida's waterways, is strong evidence of the navigability
of a stream. 91
Contrary to the position of the Florida Court that a watercourse
to be navigable must in its natural state be capable, at least in part,
of sustaining navigation without the necessity of artificial improvement, waterways are navigable in a federal sense if by means of arti87U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3, gives Congress the power to "regulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes."
8SGilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 724 (1865).
8SThe Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
soSt. Anthony Falls Water Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349
(1897); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 147 F.2d 743 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 880 (1945).
9lUnited States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 416 (1940) (dic-

tum).
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ficial aid they can within reasonable limits be made suitable for
navigation. 92 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that when any
portion of a stream is navigable the federal government has the power
to control not only the navigable portion but also the upper nonnavigable reaches of the waterway when diversions for irrigation or
other purposes in these portions would affect uninterrupted navigability in the lower reaches. 93
Federal Exercise of Power Under the Commerce Clause. A finding
of navigability and an application of federal power under the commerce clause is the key to federal intervention in a natural watercourse. Congress, with the help of the Supreme Court, has not been
shy about using this key to unlock areas thought to be in need of
federal development, even when the projects were only indirectly
connected with navigation.
Two large areas have thus seen considerable federal action: flood
control and power development. The power cases are generally sustained on the ground that the erection of a power dam serves to
improve navigation. As was said by the United States Supreme Court
in validating the erection of Boulder-now Hoover-Dam, "the
fact that purposes other than navigation will also be served could
not invalidate the exercise of the authority conferred, even if those
other purposes would not alone have justified an exercise of Congressional power."'9 4 This same argument, combined with the federal
government's power to control nonnavigable portions of navigable
watercourses, was used to justify the erection of the Dennispn Dam,
in the upper nonnavigable reaches of the Red River in Oklahoma.95
Concerning flood control, the Supreme Court has stated that there
is no constitutional reason why Congress cannot treat the "watersheds
as a key to flood control on navigable streams and their tributaries.
Nor is there a constitutional necessity for viewing each reservoir
project in isolation from a comprehensive plan covering the entire
basin of a particular river."961 On this basis, Congress has legislated
for the prevention of soil erosion to protect rivers and harbors and
maintain navigability.97 Jurisdiction over this phase of aid to naviat 407.
93United States v. Rio Grande Dam and Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
94Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 456 (1931).
o0Oklahoma v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313"U.S. 508 (1941).
96id. at 525.
97Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act §1, 49 STAT. 1149 (1936), 16
U.S.C. §59 0g (a) (1952).
92d.
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gation has been vested in the Department of Agriculture, and subdelegated to the Soil Conservation Service. Such legislation has recently culminated in the Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention
Act, commonly known as the Small Watershed Act, under which
federal aid is given for flood control in watershed areas not exceeding
25,000 acres. 98 This act created the machinery under which the federal government can co-operate with local organizations in planning
and carrying out measures for flood prevention and conservation, utilization and disposal of water. 99
To what extent has the federal government made use of the
power to protect navigation as a basis for controlling Florida's watercourses? The Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District is, of course, the most outstanding example. The justification
for the project is a finding that flood control on navigable waters or
their tributaries is the proper function of Congress in order to prevent
destructive floods which in turn obstruct navigation. 100 In enacting
federal flood control legislation, Congress has required that flood
control projects must be submitted to an affected state for comment
and that if the state objects to the project the work cannot be authorized without further specific approval by Congress itself. Congress, nevertheless, has the power to order the work done over the
objection of the state.101 In addition to flood control projects, the
federal government may, and frequently does, intervene in support
of state navigation improvement projects,102 generally with a requirement for local contribution as a condition precedent to federal grants
for the work.
9868 STAT. 666 (1954), 16 U.S.C. §1001, 33 U.S.C. §701b (Supp. 1957).
99Dovell and Tarlton, The Watershed Act: Its Application to Florida, 15 Economic Leaflets No. 2 (U. of Fla., Feb. 1956). As of November 1957, five projects
for the State of Florida have been approved, two of which are in the construction
phase. An additional ten applications are presently under consideration.
10oDeclaration of Policy, Flood Control Act, 49 STAT. 1570 (1936), 33 U.S.C.
§§701a-b (1952).
10158 STAT. 887, §1 (1944), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §701-1 (1952).
1o"Many such projects have been carried on in Florida. Among those already
completed are Courtenay Channel, Palm Beach Harbor, Port Everglades Harbor,
and East Pass Channel from the Gulf of Mexico into Choctawhatchee Bay. A few
of the projects presently under construction are Jacksonville Harbor, Canaveral
Harbor, Okeechobee Waterway, and Gulf Intracoastal Waterway between Apalachee
Bay and the Mexican Border (Mobile District). Water Resonices Development by
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Florida, U.S. Army Engineer Division (Jan.
1957).
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Finally, a word should be said about the plaee of the federal
government in interstate water disputes involving navigable streams.
Such disputes in connection with some of Florida's northern rivers
are quite possible in the foreseeable future. The Constitution of
the United States permits the settlement of disputes between states
through interstate agreements or compacts, when approved by Congress.'0 3 The compacts, along with machinery for their execution,
are worked out by the affected states. They provide a much more
satisfactory method of settlement than sporadic litigation concerning
isolated points of disagreement. Of course, the federal courts have
jurisdiction over interstate disputes in the absence of compacts; and
they have usually handled water problems on the basis of equitable
apportionment, a doctrine closely allied to the reasonable use doctrine sometimes applied to individual riparian owners.10 '
It is evident that Congress has tremendous power over navigable
streams under the commerce clause of the Constitution. How do
these powers affect the private interests of riparian owners? One obvious effect is in relation to private dam construction. Since dam
construction interferes with navigability, Congress early prohibited
the erection of dams unless the consent of Congress and the approval
of the plan by the Chief of Engineers and Secretary of the Army had
been obtained. 05 It has been held that the federal statute prohibiting
dams does not abolish the common law riparian right to build a dam

3o3U.S.

CONsT. art. I, §10, "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress

Congress has
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State....
given blanket consent to the states to negotiate compacts for the control of pollution, 62 STAT. 1155 (1948), 33 U.S.C. §466a (c) (1952). See Watson, Ohio River Com..

pact and Other Interstate Agreements, 41 J. Am. WATER WORKS Ass'N 18 (1949). In
Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106 (1938),
the Supreme Court points out that Congress had consented, as of 1938, to 15 com=hE
pacts for apportionment of waters in interstate streams. See also 3 REPORT o
PRFSmIENT's WATER RESOURCES POLICY COMMISSION, WATER REsouRCEs LAw 64-70
(1950).
014Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943); Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573
(1936) (by implication); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Connecticut
v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907);
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902) (by implication).
105River and Harbor Act §10, 26 STAT. 454 (1890); River and Harbor Act, 30
STAT. 1151 (1899), 33 U.S.C. §403 (1952). Similar state legislation, operating in
local areas, has been enacted in Florida, requiring approval by the appropriate
authority prior to the erection of obstructions in navigable waters. E.g., Fla. Spec.
Acts 1955, c. 31182 (Pinellas County Water and Navigation Control Authority).
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across a navigable stream, but merely regulates it.1o6 On the other
hand, authorization by the Chief of Engineers or Congress does not
relieve an individual from liability for harm to riparian owners on
the stream when a dam is erected. 10'
The right of the federal government to make improvements in
connection with navigation extends "to the entire bed of a stream,
which includes the land below ordinary high-water mark;"' 0 8 thus
the federal government has been held not legally liable for the destruction of private property below the high water mark. 10 9 On the
same basis, the destruction of oyster beds in the course of channel
improvement has been held not compensable, 110 although Congress
has recently authorized the Court of Claims to award damages to
oyster growers for such destruction."' Riparian owners on a nonnavigable tributary of a navigable watercourse, however, may be able
to collect damages from the federal government when an improvement in the navigable area results in flooding or other damages to
2
land on the tributary."
STATE CONTROL OVER NATURAL WATERCOURSES

It is apparent from the previous section that the federal government's authority over natural watercourses in a state is derived primarily from the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.'13
l06Pike Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. Ry., 99 F.2d 902 (8th
Cir. 1938).
lolbid.
lo8United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941).
09See Willink v. United States, 240 U.S. 572 (1916); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber
Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v.
Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
11OLewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
"162 STAT. 941 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1497 (1952).
11"United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917). See also United States v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799 (1950). This doctrine has been strictly limited to
nonnavigable streams. United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499
(1945); United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 312 U.S. 592 (1941).
ilaFurther federal authority over water resources within the state is derived
from the property clause of the United States Constitution, which gives Congress
the power "to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONsr. art IV,
§3, cl. 2. Although this provision is not of great importance in Florida, it has
had tremendous significance in the development of water law in the West, where
federal ownership of the public domain provided the basis for establishment of
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State authority over its natural watercourses must of course find its
source elsewhere. In addition to the control arising from its sovereignty over navigable waters and their beds, the state may regulate
both navigable and nonnavigable waters on the basis of its inherent
police power and its power to act for the protection of the general
welfare.114 In the area of drainage, there is an express constitutional
provision for state action."s

Pursuant to these powers, the state has chosen to act in several important areas of water management, flood control being perhaps the
most extensively developed. The seriousness of the flood control
problem in Florida is indicated by the frequency with which this
problem was raised in the 1956 county hearings of the Florida Water
Resources Study Commission." x6 From a practical viewpoint, the
most important flood control legislation concerning Florida is the
federal and state legislation of 1948 and 1949 establishing the Central
and Southern Florida Flood Control District.
Following the disastrous flood that engulfed most of South Florida
in 1947, Congress in 1948, by an amendment to the 1936 Flood Control
Act, authorized funds for a flood control project in this area on condition that the state participate in the project.11 7 The 1949 Florida

Legislature in turn enacted a general flood control act" 8 and, to imthe doctrine of prior appropriation in most of the Western states. See 3 U.S.
PREsIDENT's
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33-52 (1950). Federal proprietary authority does have significance in Florida,
however, since under it Congress has complete power over water and water
rights on federal lands. Any state regulation of water rights in or affecting the
Everglades National Park or areas such as the Ocala National Forest would,
therefore, be subject to this federal power. It is the present federal policy to permit use of waters on these lands in accordance with state laws and regulations,
but a permit must be secured from the federal government. 30 STAT. 36 (1897),
16 U.S.C. §481 (1952). In regard to the permits see 26 Or. ATr'Y GEN. 421 (1907).
"24See Peavy-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 159 Fla. 311, 31 So.2d
483 (1947); Hill v. State ex rel. Watson, 155 Fla. 245, 19 So.2d 857 (1944).
"1FFLA. CONsT. art. XVI, §28.
iL6See, e.g., 1956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3, §I.A.I. (1956) (Bay County); id.
at 12, §II.C.I. (Clay County); id. at 14, §II.A.I. (Columbia County); id. at 21,
§II.A.I. (DeSoto County); id. at 23, §II.A.I. (Duval County); id. at 30, §II.C.2.
(Glades County); id. at 32, §II.C.2. (Hardee County); id. at 38, §II.A.I. (Holmes
County); id. at 44, §II.C.l. (Lee County); id. at 65, §IIA.1. (Pasco County); id. at

80, §II.C.2. (Volusia County).
11762 STAT. 1171, 1176 (1948), originally authorized by 46
as amended.
218FIa. Laws 1949, c. 25209, now FLA. STAT. c. 378 (1955).

STAT. 918, 925 (1930),
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plement this, added chapter 25214, Laws of 1949, creating the Central
and Southern Florida Flood Control District. Section 16 of the general
act, as amended by the 1955 Florida Legislature, authorized the district "to clean out, straighten, enlarge or change the course of any
waterway, natural or artificial, within or without the district; . . .
establish, maintain and regulate water levels in all canals, channels
and reservoirs owned and maintained by the district; . . .and to hold

and have full control over the works and rights-of-way of the district."1
This statute gives the Central and Southern Florida Flood
Control District broad powers to control the physical contours of
watercourses within the district and in addition, under its authority
to regulate water levels, the power to interfere with the nonnal rights
of use of the water by riparian owners.
It is not clear from the statute whether a riparian owner is entitled to damages from the district for changes in a watercourse that
result in depriving him of the use of water or that raise the level of
the watercourse resulting in flooding of his lands.120 Although the
district, as a subdivision of the state, may share the immunity of the
state from tort actions for such harm, 12 1 the statute does give the
district eminent domain power;'"22 and it is arguable that when the
district encroaches upon a riparian owner's rights it is in effect taking
an easement in the watercourse and should be required to compen1 3
sate him as though it had exercised its right of eminent domain. "
The Legislature has enacted four types of drainage acts of statewide application. The General Drainage Act of 191312 authorized
formation of drainage districts upon approval of the appropriate circuit courts of the state. Operations under this act may affect the
rights of riparian owners on natural watercourses, inasmuch as section 28 provides that watercourses may be "connected with and be
made a part of the works and improvements ... of said district ......

1-1d. §378.16.

32()A parallel problem involving flooding by state park authorities was uncovered
by the 1956 county hearings. See 1956 RE.PORT, supra note 27, at 51, §I1.A.2. (Manatee County).
r'3See Bragg v. Board of Pub. Instr'n, 160 Fla. 590, 36 So.2d 222 (1948); Smoak
v. Tampa, 123 Fla. 716, 719, 167 So. 528, 529 (1936) (dictum); cf. Elrod v. Daytona
Beach, 132 Fla. 24. 180 So. 378 (1938). But cf. Hargrove v. Cocoa Beach, 96 So.2d
130 (Fla. 1957).
-22FLA. STAT. §378.16 (1955).
"23Cf. United States -. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
124FLA. STAT. c. 298 (1955).
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While the act provides for payment by the district for rights of
way, 25 it does not make provision for payment for injury to natural
watercourses, or for interference with the rights of riparian owners.
If these owners are to recover for any loss, it would seem that recovery would depend upon the easement argument suggested above
in connection with the taking of similar rights by the flood control
district.
Supplementary to the General Drainage Act, the Legislature has
provided for drainage by counties 12 and, in addition, for the drainage of swamps and overflow lands upon petition by the Board of
County Commissioners of any county.127 Like the General Drainage
Act, the first of these statutes does not specifically provide for compensation for interference with riparian rights; but the latter statute,
dealing with drainage of swamps and overflowed lands, does have a
specific provision for the assessment of any damages that may be sustained as a result of the construction of the drainage ditches .1 8 Although this latter statute does not specifically refer to damage to
riparian rights in watercourses into which the ditches drain, such
damages are arguably within the intendment of the act.
Although mosquito control districts are not ordinarily considered
to perform functions similar to those of drainage districts, mosquito
control acts may contain extensive drainage provisions. One of the
several Florida mosquito control acts129 authorizes counties to act
as mosquito control districts and gives them drainage powers"30 that
may interfere with riparian rights in the same way as the powers
of the drainage districts. Two other mosquito control acts provide
alternate means of establishing mosquito control districts upon the
petition of affected freeholders;"3 these acts likewise provide drainage
powers that may affect riparian rights. None of these acts makes any
provision for compensation to riparian owners. But, since these districts are entities of the state, the same arguments with respect to just
compensation that were made in the case of the flood control district
would seem applicable.

(1955).
126FLA. STAT. C. 157 (1955).
127FL. STAT. C. 156 (1955).
12SFLA. STAT. §156.06 (1955).
129FLA. STAT. cc. 388-90 (1955).
2oF.A. STAT. §388.15 (1955).
131FrA. STAT. cc. 389-90 (1955).
I25FLA. STAT. §298.30
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Finally, there is one other type of district authorized by state-wide
legislation that may affect riparian rights: the erosion prevention
district.132 Although these districts were ostensibly authorized primarily for the purpose of combatting beach erosion, the language of
the statute under which they were created is broad enough to cover
the creation of erosion prevention districts in inland counties when
necessary to control erosion of natural watercourses. 33 If such a
district were created it would give rise to the same problems that
arise from the operations of the other districts discussed.
In addition to districts created under authority of state-wide general legislation, at least ten types of special districts affecting water
use and control have been created. These districts include drainage
districts,1 a4 inlet districts,135 improvement districts,1 36 mosquito control districts,137 navigation districts,138 water supply districts,139 sani-

(1955).
1-3An example of this type of erosion was discussed at the 1956 county hearings.
See 1956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 12, §II.C.I. (Clay County).
134E.g., Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11644 (North LaBelle Drainage Dist.,
Glades County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11555 (Fellsmere Drainage Dist.,
Indian River County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11539 (Istokpoga Sub-Drainage
Dist., Highlands County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11489 (Flagler and Volusia
Counties Drainage Dist., Flagler and Volusia Counties).
"3E.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31340 (Ponce de Leon Inlet and Port Dist.,
Volusia County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925. c. 11791 (Daytona and New Smyrna
Inlet Dist., Volusia County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11693 (St. Lucie Inlet
Dist., Palm Beach and St. Lucie Counties).
136Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31153 (Cotee River Port Dist. and Auth., Pasco
County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29596 (Halifax River Waterways Improv. Dist.,
Volusia County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29293 (authorized creation of improvement
service districts, Monroe County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11486 (Ocean Shore
Improv. Dist., Flagler and Volusia Counties).
137Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 11128 (Indian River Mosquito Control Dist., St.
Lucie County).
138E.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31182 (Pinellas County Water and Navig.
Control Auth., Pinellas County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31071 (Windermere Spec.
Navigable Canal Dist., Orange County); Fla. Laws Ext. Sess. 1925, c. 11431 (Upper
St. Johns River Navig. Dist., Brevard and Seminole Counties); Fla. Spec. Acts 1925,
c. 10956 (The Lakes Tohopekaliga-Kissimmee River Navig. Dist., Osceola County).
139E.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 30602 (granting additional and supplemental
powers to any water district in Brevard County created pursuant to Fla. Laws
1951, c. 27419); Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 30567 (authorizing Bay County to construct,
or acquire, and operate a water system); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29505 (North
Beach Water Dist.. St. Lucie County).
132FLA. STAT. C. 158
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tary districts,140 conservation districts,1' 1 service districts,142 and irrigation and soil conservation districts.'" All of them, through their
powers to interfere with natural watercourses, may affect riparian
rights in the same way as the districts created by the general legislation. There have been no decisions of any consequence concerning
the effect of these districts upon such rights. These districts, however,
will play an ever-increasing part in the development of the state's
water resources and a critical role in the implementation of the 1957
Water Resources Law. A detailed study of their development and
operation is badly needed.'4
POLLUTION OF WATERCOURSES

The pollution of Florida's watercourses is a matter of grave concern to the citizens of the state. An unhappily large number of pollution problems were raised at the soil conservation district hearings
in 19541-r and at the county hearings held by the Florida Water Resources Study Commission in 1956.241

The pollution complained of

140E.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 30558 (authorizing Commissioners of Alachua
County to create sanitary districts); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29587 (Volusia County
Sanitary Dist.); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29502 (St. Lucie County Sanitary Dist.)
(including mosquito control); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29425 (Long Key Sewer
Dist., Pinellas County).
'4'FIa. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 30653 (Tsala Apopka Basin Recreation and Water
Conservation Control Auth., Citrus County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29594 (Fresh
Water Conservation Bd., Volusia County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29222 (Oklawaha Basin Recreation and Water Conservation and Control Auth., Lake County).
142E.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 30927 (authorizing creation of Special Improvement Service Districts by Board of County Comm'rs, upon petition, in unincorporated areas of Lee County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 29423 (Gulf Beach Serv.
Dist., Pinellas County).
143Fla. Spec. Acts 1953, c. 28935 (Tindall Hammock Irrigation and Soil Conservation Dist., Broward County).
'4"See Maloney, Florida's New Water Resources Law, 10 U. FLA. L. REV.
119, 138-41, 152 (1957).
145The survey indicates 16 problems in 14 counties. See 1954 REPoRT, supra
note 27, §II.E.I., problems 1-5 (Alachua, Hamilton, Okeechobee, St. Lucie, and
Walton Counties); id. §II.E.2., problems 1-8 (Bradford, Charlotte, DeSoto, Escambia, Manatee, Pasco, and Putnam Counties); id §II.E.3., problems 1-3 (Charlotte, Lake, and Orange Counties).
246See 1956 REPoRT, supra note 27, at 1, §II.E.2. (Alachua County); id. at 4,
§II.E.I. (Bradford County); id. at 9, §II.E.1. (Calhoun County); id. at 10, §II.E.2.
(Charlotte County); id. at 15, §II.E.2. (Columbia County); id. at 21, §H.E.1. (DeSoto County); id. at 23, §II.E.2. (Duval County); id. at 26, §I.E.2. (Escambia
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resulted in part from municipal wastes, 14 7 in part from industrial
wastes, 148 and in part from the use of insecticides, 14 with the industrial wastes by far the most serious offender. There are statutes of

both general and special application designed to prevent this pollution. Why, then, does it continue on such a wide scale? An analysis of these statutes and the decided cases may provide part of the
answer.
Remedies Available to an individual
At common law there are three possible approaches to the problem of pollution. In the first place, the pollution may be classed as
a nuisance, making applicable the laws regarding prevention of nuisances.1 50 Second, the dumping of wastes, particularly industrial
County); id. at 27, §II.E.l. (Franklin County); id. at 33, §II.E.I. (Hardee County);
id. at 35, §II.E.l. (Hernando County); id. at 37, §II.E.2. (Hillsborough County);
id. at 38, §II.E.I. (Holmes County); id. at 40, §II.E.l. (Indian River County);
id. at 42, §II.E.1. (Jefferson County); id. at 46, §II.E.2 (Leon County); id. at 49,
§II.E.2. (Madison County); id. at 51, §II.E.I., at 52, §II.E.2. (Manatee County); id.
at 58, §II.E.2. (Okaloosa County); id. at 60, §II.E.2. (Okeechobee County); id.
at 62, §II.E.I. (Orange County); id. at 63, §II.E.I. (Palm Beach County); id. at 68,
§II.E.2. (Pinellas County); id. at 71, §II.E.2. (Putnam County); id. at 74, §II.E.I..
at 75, §II.E.2. (Santa Rosa County); id. at 76, §II.E.1. (Seminole County); id. at
77, §II.E.2. (Sumter County); id. at 78, §II.E.I. (Taylor County); id. at 83, §Ii.E.l.
(Walton County).
147E.g., 1956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 12, §II.E.I. (Clay County) (municipalities and naval vessels polluting St. Johns River); id. at 58, §II.E.l. (Okaloosa
County); id. at 73, §II.E.I. (St. Lucie County) ("Lack of sewage disposal facilities
at towns along the river has turned the Indian River into a giant cesspool, rated
by the State Board of Health as a health hazard"); id. at 74, §II.E.I. (Santa Rosa
County); id. at 76 §II.E.2. (Seminole County) (pollution of stream has ruined
fishing and swimming and sometimes gives off an offensive odor).
1181956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 3, §II.E.1. (Bay County); id. at 15, §II.E.2.
(Columbia County) (chemical waste); id. at 33, §II.E.l. (Hardee County); id.
at 49, §II.E.2. (Madison County) (Georgia pulp mill); id. at 51, §II.E.I. (Manatee
County) (sanitary and laundry wastes); id. at 56, §II.E.1. (Martin County); id. at
75, §II.E.2. (Santa Rosa County) (Alabama paper mill); id. at 83, §II.E.2. (Walton
County) (saw mill wastes). Citrus wastes have also been mentioned as a polluting
agent.
1491954 REPORT, supra note 27, §II.E.3., problem 1. Insecticide sprays used
by farmers and grove owners in Charlotte County, some of which were water
soluble and very toxic to humans, drained into a creek. The city had no authorit)
over this, and the city water supply was very much endangered. See also id. problems 2 (a lake in Lake County) and 3 (drainage canal in Orange County).
15 0See generally McRae, The Development of Nuisance in the Early Common
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wastes, into a stream might be considered to result from a nonnatural
use of the land, to which the common law of England attached strict
or absolute liability. 51 A Florida circuit court in Ague v. American
Agric. Chem. Co.1 52 rejected the strict liability approach and limited
potential liability to the third approach, requiring proof of negligence on the part of the industry as a prerequisite for liability.
Some courts have protected municipalities from suits for damages
for injuries resulting from sewage disposal activities on the theory
of governmental immunity. 53 The Florida Court, however, has apparently recognized municipal liability for personal injury to a
riparian owner stemming from sewage pollution of a stream, although
the question of immunity does not seem to have been raised on
appeal.

54

Even assuming that liability is established, the possibility of recovery of money damages is not always a sufficient deterrent to prevent industrial pollution. Large industrial polluters are often willing
to settle for damages as a part of the cost of carrying on their business. And, in some situations, by resisting suit the industry can make
the remedy by way of damages so expensive that a private individual
will be unwilling to litigate. If individuals attempt to band together
for the purpose of bringing suit for damages on the theory of nuisance, they will be confronted by cases denying them the right to
sue jointly for damages because the damages suffered by them are
not the same. 55 Moreover, if one landowner undertakes to join in
a single suit several polluters whose wastes combine to damage him,
he may be blocked by an early Florida case denying the right of
joinder in this situation on the ground that the defendants were not
acting in concert. 56
As an alternative to an action for damages, the individual riparian owner may seek an injunction in equity against further
Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27 (1948); 56 Am. JUR., Waters, §§411, 432 (1947).
15lRylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).
1525 Fla. Supp. 133 (1953).
153See 18 McQuIt.NI,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §53.131
(3d ed. 1950); cf.
cases cited note 121 supra.
'S4Lakeland v. Douglass, 143 Fla. 771, 197 So. 467 (1940).
'15 See Ainsworth v. Allen, Kirby 145 (Conn. 1786); CLARK, CODE PLEADING
§56 (1947).
'S6Standard Phosphate Co. v. Lunn, 66 Fla. 220, 63 So. 429 (1913). The validity of this case may be questioned in the light of the liberality of joinder
made possible under the 1954 Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, but the case has
not yet been overruled.
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pollution; and if the injunction is granted the equity court may
award damages for past harm. The injunctive remedy is a much more
effective sanction than a suit at law for damages because the result
will be an order from the court to the polluter to cease his wrongful
activity. In the absence of legislation, however, the Florida Court
has indicated that the individual must do more than establish the
fact of pollution - he must also show substantial damage to himself.
Failure to establish this damage will result in denial of an injunction. 151 Even if substantial damage is established, the riparian owner
may nevertheless be denied an injunction on the balance of convenience doctrine.158 This doctrine is particularly likely to be applied
when the offender is a municipality whose citizens will be greatly
harmed if an injunction is granted, since the result would be to
prevent the disposal of sewage. In at least one case the Supreme
Court of Florida has denied injunctive relief on this ground. 1 59 Under such circumstances the private individual is left with very little
remedy for the prevention of stream pollution. No Florida cases
were found in which injunctive relief was granted on a common law
basis, although the Florida Supreme Court has stated, by way of
dictum, that riparian owners have the right to have water kept free
from pollution. 60
Remedies Available to Government Agencies
a. State Action
Pollution of a navigable stream could be considered a public
nuisance under traditional common law doctrines, on the theory
that it interferes with the public's right to use of the watercourse.
This might constitute sufficient grounds for injunctive relief at the
request of the appropriate governmental agency,' 0 ' although no Florl5lBray v. Winter Garden, 40 So.2d 459 (Fla. 1949).
15sSee Maloney, The Balance of Convenience Doctrine in the Southeastern
States, Particularly As Applied to Water, 5 S.C.L.Q. 159 (1952).
"O5Lakeland v. State ex rel. Harris, 143 Fla. 761, 197 So. 470 (1940).
Ferry Pass Inspectors' & Shippers' Ass'n v. Whites River Inspectors' &
1oSee
Shippers' Ass'n, 57 Fla. 399, 402, 48 So. 643, 645 (1909) (dictum).
16 'See Barrett v. Mount Greenwood Cemetery Ass'n, 159 Ill. 385, 42 N.E. 891
(1896); Auger Silk Dyeing Co. v. East Jersey Water Co., 88 N.J.L. 273, 96 At. 60
(1915); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 At. 386 (1924);
cf. Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203, 101 At. 379 (1917); Town
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ida cases recognizing this common law right were found.
As an alternative, governmental control of pollution may be established by legislation. There are a number of pollution acts in
Florida, both general and special. The general Pollution of Waters

Act of 191312 forbids any deposit of deleterious substances in the
rivers of the state if such substances are "liable to affect the health
of persons, fish, or livestock."'16 3 Enforcement of this law is placed
under the supervision of the State Board of Health. On its face the
statute seems broad enough to prevent pollution of Florida's watercourses, but the law as enacted contains no provisions for injunctive
enforcement; criminal penalties only are provided for its violation.
The number of complaints concerning industrial pollution in the
1954 and 1956 state-wide surveys indicated that stronger enforcement
provisions were needed.
In an apparent effort to plug this loophole, the State Board of
Health in 1955 obtained an amendment to the chapter enumerating
the general powers of the Board.64 This amendment gives the Board
the power "to enjoin and abate nuisances dangerous to the health
of persons, fish, and livestock." The amendment did not strengthen
the Pollution of Waters Act itself, since that act does not specifically
designate unlawful pollution as a nuisance. In 1957 another effort
was made to increase state control over pollution. An additional section was added to the Pollution of Waters Act, specifically authorizing the State Board of Health to apply for injunctions to restrain
violations of the act.165 Both temporary and permanent injunctions
may be issued, although temporary injunctions issued without notice
and hearing require posting of bond; and ex parte orders limiting
or preventing operation of industrial, manufacturing, or processing
plants must be predicated on a clear showing of irreparable injury.
In the event that a temporary injunction is issued without bond, the
state waives its sovereign immunity from suit for damages should
the order prove to be improper, erroneous, or improvidently granted.
It will remain to be seen how effective the Board's new power will be.
In addition to the enforcement powers granted to the State Board
of Health, the boards of county commissioners of counties estabof Shelby v. Cleveland Mill and Power Co., 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E. 218
(statute).
162FLA. STAT. C. 387 (1955), enacted as Fla. Laws 1913, c. 6443.
188FLA. STAT. §387.08 (1955).
164FLA. STAT. §381.031 (4) (b) (1955).
1i5Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-216.

(1911)
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lishing water or sanitary sewer systems under the County Water System and Sanitary Financing Act 1 66 are empowered to seek injunc-

tions 67 against pollution of any source of supply of water for human
consumption to be used in a water supply system established under
the act. The effectiveness of this act depends on the willingness of
county authorities to take action under it.
There are two other pollution acts general in application but
severely limited in scope. The first, dealing with wastes from mines,'
authorizes the boards of county commissioners to seek injunctions to
prevent such wastes from escaping into the streams of the state. This
statute may be accomplishing the purpose for which it was designed,
since neither the 1953 Soil Conservation Survey nor the 1956 Problems Inventory disclosed complaints concerning pollution resulting
from waste from mines. The statute has several weaknesses, however,
inasmuch as it requires, as a condition to obtaining an injunction,
proof that the person conducting mining operations is not using due
diligence to prevent the escape of waste or debris. It also provides
that the escape of debris because of excessive rains or floods shall
not be an offense within the meaning of the chapter.1'9 The second

limited act condemns the polluting of fresh waters if the pollution is
sufficient to injure or kill fish.170 Here again the act contains a major
flaw. The only enforcement provisions are criminal sanctions after
the damage is done.
The 1957 amendment to the Pollution of Waters Act is a new
and improved weapon in the state's battle against pollution. If it
does not prove adequate to do the job, legislative consideration might
be given to authorizing appropriate groups of private individuals to
seek injunctive relief if public authorities failed to act. 17 '

Similar

legislation already exists in Florida in connection with suits to enjoin gambling establishments and related legislatively-declared public
nuisances.172

153 (1955), enacted as Fla. Laws 1955, c. 29857.
§153.03 (10) (1955).
18SFLA. STAT. c. 533 (1955).
169FLA. STAT. §§533.02-.03 (1955).
17OFLA. STAT. §372.85 (1955).
171See MASS. ANN. LAWS C. 139, §16 (1950), Carleton v. Rugg, 149 Mass. 550, 22
N.E. 55 (1889).
172FLA. STAT. §§64.11, 823.05 (1955); see Valdez v. State ex rel. Farrior, 142
Fla. 123, 194 So. 388 (1940); National Container Corp. v. State ex rel. Stockton,
158 Fla. 52, 189 So. 4 (1959); Gullatt v. State ex rel. Collins, 169 Ga. 538. 150
S.E. 825 (1929); Chicago Fair Grounds Ass'n v. People, 60 Ill. App. 488 (1895).
166FLA. STAT. c.
167FLA. STAT.
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Although there are numerous special acts in Florida prohibiting
or otherwise controlling pollution, 173 two recent special acts in effect
undermine the existing pollution control laws, at least within the area
in which these acts operate. These acts declare Nassau County74 and
Taylor County175 to be "industrial counties" and state that it is in
the interest of the public that industry be empowered to discharge
sewage and industrial and chemical wastes into the tidal waters of
Nassau County and into the Fenholloway River in Taylor County.
Such attempted limitations on pollution control for the benefit of
special interests were the subject of severe criticism at the 1956 hearings of the Water Resources Study Commission. If attacked, the
legislation might well be held unconstitutional on the ground that
it deprives riparian owners on these waters of.property rights without compensation, in violation of the state and federal constitutions. 176
b. FederalAction
Until 1948 Congress concerned itself only with pollution that
would result in a direct impediment to navigation, and prohibitions
generally were aimed at waste "other than that flowing.., in a liquid
state." 77 In 1948 a broad anti-pollution law, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, was enacted.1 7 8 Congress made reference not only
to navigation but also to public health and welfare as justification
for the legislation. The act contains provisions for injunctive action
to halt pollution nuisances, but under the original legislation the
Attorney General was authorized to initiate'suits only if the state
in which the pollution originated consented to such a suit. This limitation on the enforcement of the act was removed by amendment in
1956.179 Under the amended act the Surgeon General must first request the water pollution control agency of the polluting state to
173E.g., Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31330; Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 31238 (prohibiting
pollution in St. Lude County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1955, c. 80631 (prohibiting pollu-

tion in Broward County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 11288 (control of fishing in
Washington County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 10765 (control of fishing in Lafayette

County); Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 10686 (protection of fish in Indian River County);
Fla. Spec. Acts 1925, c. 10664 (protection of fish in Hardee County).
174Fa. Spec. Acts 1941, c. 21415.
175Fa. Spec. Acts 1947, c. 24952.'
'176U.S. CONST. aiiiend. XIV, §1; FLA. CONsr. Decl. of Rights, .§12.
17725 STAr. 209 (1888), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §441 (1952).
17862 STAT. 1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §466 (1952).
17970 STAT. 498 (1956).
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take necessary remedial action. If action is not taken within six
months, a hearing is scheduled before a board composed in part of
representatives from the affected states. Finally, assuming that the
pollution continues, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
may request the Attorney General to initiate suit at the written request of the pollution control agency of the injured state. Although
the act thus provides for federal injunctive sanctions, the underlying
purpose of the act is apparently to provide a means by which the
federal government, through the Surgeon General, may provide technical assistance to state agencies and industries in the formulation and
execution of state pollution control programs.
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act is also designed to
encourage states to negotiate compacts between themselves for the
control of interstate pollution. The act gives blanket consent to the
states for negotiation of interstate compacts for this purpose. 8 0 The
compacts must, however, be approved by Congress, and as yet Congress has approved no compacts initiated under the act. Prior to the
enactment of the 1948 law, several interstate compacts for the control
and abatement of pollution were separately approved by Congress. 8'
Several problems reported to the county committees of the Florida
Water Resources Study Commission involved pollution of Florida
streams by industries in Georgia and Alabama.s2 Perhaps the eventual solution of some of these problems may be found by use of this
act.
Another answer to interstate pollution problems might be for
the State of Florida, acting as parens patriae, to bring an original
action in the United States Supreme Court to enjoin the industries
in the offending states and force them to correct the pollution nuisance. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.183 the State of Georgia
successfully enjoined industries in Tennessee on this basis. Industries
near the border in Tennessee were polluting the air in Georgia; the
noxious fumes caused personal discomfort to citizens and ruined
crops and foliage. Tennessee stressed the importance of the copper
1155 (1948), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §466 (c) (1952).
l8lE.g., 61 STAT. 682 (1947); 54 STAT. 7408 (1940); 52 STAT. 150 (1938); 49 STAT.
932 (1935).
1821956 REPORT, supra note 27, at 46, §II.E.2. (Leon County) (pollution by
Georgia industries); id. at 49, §II.E.2. (Madison County) (pollution by paper mill
in Georgia); id. at 75, §II.E.2. (Santa Rosa County) (pollution by pulp mill in
Alabama).
183206 U.S. 230 (1907).
18062 STAT.
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industry and asked the Court to apply the balance of convenience
doctrine. The Court indicated great reluctance to apply the doctrine
against a state acting in a quasi-sovereign capacity and granted a mandatory injunction against the offending industries, commanding them
to take corrective measures. Individual citizens of Georgia had previously been denied the same injunctive relief in the Tennessee courts
on the basis of the balance of convenience doctrine.18 4
Prevention of another type of pollution, that caused by salt water
intrusion, has also received some congressional attention.185 This is
an acute problem in some areas of Florida where the erection of salt
water barriers in navigable streams is necessary for the protection
of municipal water supplies. As a matter of law, the consent of the
federal government may be necessary before these barriers are constructed, 86 though doubtless this consent can be readily obtained.
FuTuRE NEEDs AN PRoBLEms
In the past, Florida's streams have moved faster than the laws
that gave direction to their use and development. This was probably
to be expected in a state in which until recent years supply far
outran consumptive demand and streams were more frequently used
for disposal than supply.
Earlier litigation for the most part involved nonconsumptive uses,
primarily navigation. The law in this field has become relatively
well settled, although its application to individual fact situations,
such as the location of high and low water marks, will continue to
present difficult problems.
As yet little thought has been given by the Legislature or the
87
courts to the protection of recreational users of Florida's streams.
These users, however, are probably sufficiently protected by the extremely broad judicial definition of navigability, 88 which keeps
most of Florida's streams available for recreational use by the public.
'S4Madison v. Ducktown Sulfur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.V.

658 (1904).
185E.g., 50 STAT. 844, 850
Project.

(1937), authorizing the California Central Valley

1S6See p. 315 supra.
1S7But cf. Taylor v. Tampa Coal Co., 46 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1950) (one owner on
nonnavigable lake, using lake for employees! recreation, had right to enjoin

other owner from irrigating to the extent of injuriously lowering lake level).
l88See p. 309 supra.
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In the area of drainage, the most serious problems are physical
rather than legal. Cultivation and development of upland areas may
place an additional drainage burden on a stream, overtaxing downstream bridges and culverts that were adequate to handle the flow in
an earlier day when only wooded and relatively undeveloped
areas drained into the stream. Thus the result of upstream development may be the flooding of downstream lands.1 89 The rights of riparian owners on such streams are in need of legislative clarification.
In the area of pollution there are still many problems to be solved,
and constant vigilance by the State Board of Health will be necessary to prevent further contamination as the use of Florida's streams
increases. Fortunately the machinery now apparently is available
to control this problem in most areas. The related problem of salt
water intrusion is perhaps more difficult of solution.-°
In so far as consumptive use of Florida's streams is concerned,
the 1957 Water Resources Law provides machinery for putting the
excess flow of these streams to profitable use. 191 Uncertainty concerning the depth of riparian holdings, however, may still prevent
full use of Florida's streams for agricultural and other purposes. In
this area the Legislature might well consider defining riparian land
in such a way as to assure the broadest interpretation of the extent
of these holdings. 192 One important method of increasing the use
of water in streams is through storage behind dams. There is adequate provision in Florida law for dams for power development; but,
as in other areas of consumptive use, further legislation would be
helpful to encourage and control the use of these structures for agricultural and similar purposes. The legislation should, of course, protect the public right of navigation as well as the rights of riparian
owners to obtain water in times of drought or low flow.
Additional study of the use of water management districts as a
means of more fully utilizing available supplies is also indicated.191s9See note 27 supra.

19OThe 1957 Water Resources Law provides at least one means of controlling
salt water intrusion through the establishment of water development and conservation districts in critical areas. Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-380, §11. Since salt water
intrusion primarily affects ground water supplies, it will be discussed in detail
in the next article in this series.
. 191See Maloney, Florida's New Water Resources Law, 10 U. Ft.,. L. Rav. 119,
138-46 (1957).
192See

id. at 132 n. 57.

19.See note 144 supra.
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Development of a model law for the creation of these districts would
be very helpful.
It perhaps is fortunate that there is as yet little law governing the
consumptive use of water from Florida's streams. The way has been
left open for sound future development in this area. The 1957 Water
Resources Law was the first major step in a projected long-range
program aimed toward making beneficial utilization of Florida's
priceless water resources.194 In coming sessions of the Legislature the
new Department of Water Resources of the State Board of Conservation will be in a position to recommend legislation looking toward
filling the gaps that remain.
An analysis of the present state of Florida law with regard to
man-made channels, underground streams, diffused surface water,
and ground water will be contained in the next article in this series.

14Fla. Laws 1957, c. 57-380; see Maloney, Florida'sNew Water Resources Law,
10 U. FLA. L. REv. 119 (1957).

